Flock Cameras, ALPR Tech and Community Privacy Policy

Automated license plate readers such as Flock cameras are positioned as tools that help law enforcement locate stolen vehicles, investigate serious crimes, and find missing or endangered people. Crucially, these systems also create major privacy concerns by creating detailed records of where all individuals travel, potentially allowing government agencies or individual officers to track people who are not suspected of any crime. 

Recent cases across the country, including here in Wisconsin, have exposed egregious abuses of these systems, including law enforcement personnel allegedly using their access to track individuals for personal purposes. These are not abstract privacy concerns. They demonstrate what can happen when enormous amounts of location data are collected and made searchable without adequate legal restrictions, access controls, and independent oversight.

Technology capable of reconstructing a person’s movements must not be deployed without clear public rules, democratic oversight, strict controls on access, and substantial legal consequences for abuse. I also believe the aggregation and warrantless searching of this location data raises serious Fourth Amendment concerns regarding unreasonable government searches.

I support a moratorium on usage of automated license plate reader (ALPR) technology and networks (Flock, Axon, etc) until strong regulatory protections are in place. Protections must put citizens’ privacy first, strictly limit access and retention, prevent the creation of an unrestricted nationwide tracking network, require independent oversight, and give communities a choice in deciding whether this technology should operate in their community.

The regulatory policies I will pursue follow below.

1. Give Communities Control Over Surveillance Technology

Local police departments must not be able to install or substantially expand large surveillance networks without public knowledge and approval.

I support requirements that communities:

• Receive advance public disclosure before automated license plate readers or similar surveillance technologies are purchased or deployed.

• Hold a public hearing explaining what technology is being proposed, what information it collects, how long information will be stored, who can access it, and what agencies can receive the data.

• Require affirmative approval from the elected local governing body before deployment, renewal, or major expansion.

• Allow communities to require a public referendum when residents want the decision made directly by voters.

• Require periodic reconsideration rather than allowing surveillance programs to continue indefinitely without review.

2. Limit Surveillance to Legitimate Law-Enforcement Investigations

License plate databases should never be available for casually searching where someone has been.

I support requiring:

• A legitimate, documented, law-enforcement purpose for every search.

• A case number, incident number, or documented investigative justification tied to every database query.

• Judicial warrants for searches involving significant amounts of historical location information or access to privately operated ALPR networks where appropriate.

• Clear limits on which crimes and investigations justify allowable use of these systems.

• Human review before automated alerts alone are used as the basis for significant law-enforcement action.

3. Protect Innocent People's Location Data

The majority of vehicles captured by these systems belong to people who are not suspected of wrongdoing - regular citizens going about their lives. Their location histories should never be stored indefinitely.

I support:

• Short automatic retention periods for data involving people who are not connected to an investigation, with a goal of approximately seven days wherever operationally practical.

• Longer retention only when information has been properly connected to an active investigation or legal proceeding.

• Preventing local vehicle-location records from automatically entering a nationwide searchable surveillance database.

• Strict restrictions on sharing data with federal agencies, other states, or outside jurisdictions unless there is a legitimate investigation and appropriate documented legal authorization.

• Prohibiting the use of ALPR systems to monitor constitutionally protected political activity, protests, religious activity, reproductive healthcare, or immigration status absent an independent lawful basis for investigation.

• Additional safeguards around sensitive locations such as private residences, schools, healthcare facilities, houses of worship, courts, shelters, and similar locations.

4. Require Independent Auditing and Accountability

Every ALPR system should maintain a permanent audit trail showing:

• Who conducted a search.

• When the search occurred.

• What vehicle or plate was searched.

• The documented justification or associated case number.

• What agencies received or accessed the information.

Agencies using these systems should be subject to regular independent audits rather than relying exclusively on internal police review.

Communities should also have open access to regular public reports and disclosure showing overall search volume, outside-agency access, data-sharing activity, successful investigative uses, misuse investigations, disciplinary actions, and other information necessary to evaluate whether the system is providing legitimate public-safety value or being misused.

Intentional misuse should carry substantial legal consequences, including disciplinary action, loss of system access, and appropriate civil or criminal penalties when someone knowingly uses government surveillance systems for personal or unlawful purposes.

5. Put Strict Rules on Flock and Other ALPR Vendors

Contracts with Flock or any other ALPR and related surveillance provider should require that:

• The local government entity retains ownership and control of its data.

• Vendors cannot sell location data.

• Vendors cannot independently share or repurpose government-collected data.

• Outside agencies and entities cannot automatically search local databases without authorization.

• Local government agencies have full control over retention periods and information-sharing settings.

• Vendors maintain strong cybersecurity protections and disclose breaches or unauthorized access immediately.

• Contracts allow communities to terminate service and permanently delete collected information with clear evidence of removal.

6. Establish Federal Privacy Standards While Enabling Stronger Local Protections

Congress must establish baseline privacy and privacy protections for automated license plate readers and other location-tracking technologies.

Federal legislation should establish minimum baseline standards for:

• Data retention.

• Search justification.

• Warrants for sensitive historical searches.

• Interstate and federal information sharing.

• Public disclosure.

• Audit requirements.

• Vendor data practices.

• Cybersecurity.

• Protected activities and sensitive locations.

• Penalties for intentional misuse.

These standards would serve as a floor, not a ceiling. States and local communities then have the ability to adopt stronger privacy protections or prohibit the technology entirely as desired for their community.